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Over the past two years, the EU has spent almost 100 million Euro to improve
the Libyan coast guard’s ability to implement a “Search and Rescue Zone” in the
Mediterranean. This financial cooperation is now the object of a legal complaint,
filed by a coalition of NGOs led by the Global Legal Action Network. The complaint
alleges that financial support for the Libyan coast guard violates European and
international law. The complaint was addressed to the European Court of Auditors
and has drawn international media attention. We have supported this finding
in an underlying legal opinion and summarize the main legal arguments in this
blogpost. The case illustrates that outsourcing migration control to third countries
– the “bouncers” beyond Europe’s borders – is not only subject to human rights
constraints, but also has limits in EU budgetary law and its law of development
cooperation.
Illegality of the Libya Action
The projects in support of the Libyan coast guards are arguably illegal in their current
form because they do not meet the applicable requirements imposed by EU law
on funding external actions. The projects are financed from the “EU Trust Fund
for Africa”, which is in turn funded primarily by the European Development Fund
(EDF). The regulation which establishes the current EDF limits the objectives and
purposes for which resources from the EDF can be spent to poverty reduction
and development in the recipient country. The Libya projects focus on border
management and enhancing the capacity of the Libyan coast guard, e.g. through
training or the delivery of new vessels. None of these activities contributes to poverty
reduction or development in Libya. In particular, developing the capacity of an
enforcement institution like the Libyan coast guard is insufficient to count as a
contribution to good governance.
This reading is supported by the case law of the Court of Justice of the EU: In the
leading case on the matter,  brought by the European Parliament (EP) against
the Commission, the Court annulled a Commission decision on funding border
management in the Philippines because it did not comply with the funding objectives
established in applicable legislation. The Court held that the strengthening of
institutional capacity of border management was insufficient because it was not in
“direct connection with its aim of strengthening investment and development.”
The Courts judgement emphasizes the constitutional dimension behind the
seemingly technical issue of funding objectives: Enforcing compliance with the
- 1 -
funding objectives enshrined in legislation ultimately protects parliamentary control
and budgetary authority, both at EU and member state level. Inconsistency with
funding objectives is thus not a technical issue but a problem of institutional balance
and democratic principle within the European multilevel constitutional order. Similar
considerations apply to other funding instruments, and this general rationale cannot
be circumvented by channeling development resources through a trust fund.
Inadequacy of the legal framework
At a more general level, the entire legal framework applicable to the Libya
projects is inadequate from the perspective of EU financial regulations and
primary constitutional law. The EU Trust Fund for Africa, which funds the projects,
circumvents legal requirements that ensure sound financial management and
parliamentary control, and it does not contain adequate safeguards for the protection
of human rights of migrants affected by the Libya action.
The Trust Fund was established as an emergency fund under the EU Financial
Regulations of 2012 but does not meet the legal requirements for establishing
such new emergency instruments. If the main objective of the Trust Fund is to
address “root causes” of migration, as it claims, it largely duplicates existing funding
instruments that already address these causes and its added value is doubtful. If the
main objective of the Trust Fund is to address a short-term migration crisis, it cannot
be funded from the EDF, which has long-term developmental objectives. Again, this
is not just a technical issue but a matter of parliamentary budgetary authority and
institutional balance.
Deficient human rights safeguards
The legal framework applicable to the Libya projects is also deficient because it
does not establish adequate safeguards for the protection of the human rights of
persons affected by the actions it funds. More specifically, it lacks a transparent and
binding framework for human rights due diligence that assess and monitors risks for
affected individuals and vulnerable groups, especially migrants returned to Libya by
the Libyan coast guard.
The EU has legal obligations to protect human rights in its external actions, including
in actions funded through its general budget and trust funds. These obligations
legally require the EU to integrate a human rights due diligence framework in funding
instruments like the EU Trust Fund for Africa. While the primary responsibility to
respect and protect human rights of refugees and migrants in Libya lies with Libyan
authorities, the EU must ensure that its funding decisions and their implementation
do not contribute to human rights violations by Libyan authorities.
Extraterritorial duty to protect
The EU Charter of fundamental rights specifically protects against the type of
violations faced by migrants returned by the Libyan coast guard to Libya, namely
torture (Art. 4), slavery (Art. 5.1.) and refoulement (Arts. 18, 19). Protection against
such violations is not limited to the territory of the member states. The Charter has
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no jurisdictional clause similar to Art. 1 ECHR or Art. 2 ICCPR, and Art. 3 (5) and Art.
21 (1) and (3) TEU explicitly establish that the EU is bound to respect international
law and required to ensure that EU policies do not negatively affect human rights in
third countries.
The Charter also establishes a duty to protect against human rights violations
committed by third parties. This implies, a maiore ad minus, an obligation not to aid
and abet such violations by third parties, especially through financial assistance. In
situations like the Libya action, the extraterritorial duty to protect will largely depend
on procedural safeguards. There is increasing agreement in legal scholarship and
practice that a minimum requirement for external action with possible human rights
impacts is the conduct of human rights due diligence, and in particular human rights
impact assessments. The EU already conducts human rights impact assessments
in the context of trade agreements and other-trade related measures, and the
European Courts have recognized a legal obligation to do so in cases where a trade
agreement may even indirectly encourage the violation of fundamental rights (see
especially here paras. 231, 241 et seq). If the risk of indirect encouragement through
trade is sufficient to trigger an obligation for human rights due diligence, then direct
financial support triggers this requirement a fortiori.
This primary law reasoning is confirmed by applicable secondary law instruments,
which oblige the EU to abide by human rights in its external financing action.
The EDF regulation, among others, requires that the Union “shall promote […] a
rights-based approach encompassing all human rights, whether civil and political,
economic, social and cultural, in order to integrate human rights principles in the
implementation of this Regulation […]” and comply with the values of “liberty,
democracy, the universality and indivisibility of, and respect for, human rights and
fundamental freedoms, and the principles of equality and the rule of law”.
Mandatory human rights impact assessments in external financing
To ensure compliance with the requirements of due diligence, funding decisions
must be preceded by a human rights impact assessment. This assessment must
objectively evaluate human rights risks and include measures to avoid and mitigate
these risks. Project implementation must be accompanied by a system that
continuously monitors and evaluates human rights impacts on the ground. Where
there are heightened human rights risks, as in the context of the Libya action, the
assessment must be conducted independently and transparently, and its outcomes
must be made available to the public.
The EU Trust Fund for Africa does not have the framework for human rights
due diligence required by EU primary and secondary law. It does not foresee an
independent evaluation of human rights risk, remains intransparent and does not
publish assessment results. The deficiencies of the EUTFA framework become
particularly apparent when compared with the safeguard mechanisms of other donor
institutions, especially the World Bank’s Environmental and Social Framework.
Conclusion
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The EU’s framework for external financing needs a fundamental overhaul from
the perspective of budgetary law and human rights. Enforcing such changes in
EU courts is made difficult by the restrictive standing rules that limit direct actions
against the EU. In the absence of references from national courts, the EU’s Court of
Auditors is thus the first port of call for financial accountability at the EU level through
scrutiny of the Commission’s use of the EU. The auditors cannot annul actions
in question, but they can make expert findings that draw attention to the deficient
legal frameworks and practices. Ensuring that EU external financing complies with
requirements of institutional balance and human rights is ultimately the task of the
EU legislative organs, the European Parliament and the European Commission,
and national parliaments. Until such compliance is ensure, they must stop funding
Europe’s bouncers beyond borders.
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